Inhoudsopgave:
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It can be easily argued that the radical nature and challenge of Heideggerâs thinking is grounded in his early embrace of the phenomenological method as providing an access to concrete lived experience (or âfactical life,â as he called it) beyond the imposition of theoretical constructs such as âsubjectâ and âobject,â âmindâ and âbody.â Yet shortly after the publication of his groundbreaking work Being and Time, Heidegger appeared to abandon phenomenology as the method of philosophy. Why? Heidegger was conspicuously quiet on this issue. Here, William McNeill examines the question of the fate of phenomenology in Heideggerâs thinking and its transformation into a âthinking of Beingâ that regards its task as that of âletting be.â The relation between phenomenology and âletting be,â McNeill argues, is by no means a straightforward one. It poses the question of whether, and to what extent, Heideggerâs thought of his middle and late periods still needs phenomenology in order to accomplish its taskâand if so, what kind of phenomenology. What becomes of phenomenology in the course of Heideggerâs thinking? |
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